Most presuppositions are also classical entailments. The case of factivity

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In the linguistic literature, it is commonly assumed that presuppositions differ from entailments, as presuppositions, unlike entailments, project under negation (principle of *constancy under negation*). This presentation aims at showing that the common claim that presuppositions unlike entailments are constant under negation rests on a fallacious analysis stemming from the semantic notion of presupposition (cfr. Strawson 1950, 1952, van Fraassen 1968, Keenan 1971). By contrast, one of the advantages offered by the currently dominant pragmatic notion of presupposition is that this framework allows us to see that some presuppositions, in fact most standard cases of presuppositions, are also classical entailments (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 1990, Stalnaker 1999). As Stalnaker (1999: 54) puts it: "[…] if presupposition is defined independently of truth-conditions, then one can separate the question of entailment relations from the question of presupposition." Not all presuppositions, however, are also classical entailments—some presuppositions are merely pragmatic phenomena, which arise depending on the context. *Factivity* offers a paradigmatic example. In this presentation, it is argued that we need to distinguish between the factivity related to *know* and the factivity related to *regret* as the former, but not the latter, is also a classical entailment. This claim stands in contrast with Karttunen's (1971) well-known analysis of factive verbs and his distinction between *true factives* (that is, emotive factives such as *regret*) and *semifactives* (that is, cognitive factives such as *realize* and *discover*). It will be shown that Karttunen's analysis needs to be reviewed for two reasons. On the one hand, Karttunen's analysis was based on the assumption that if someone regrets that *p*, then *p must* be true. I argue that this claim is not tenable. On the other hand, Karttunen's distinction was grounded on projection tests. As shown in recent works (Beaver 2010, Simons *et al.* forthcoming, Tonhauser *et al.* 2013), these tests address the utterance's information structure, and they are not a diagnostic for presuppositionality, but rather for any implication's discourse status. These tests tell nothing about the relation between the sentence and the embedded proposition. Hence, it is argued that by focussing on projection tests a fundamental distinction has been overlooked in the literature, the distinction between two different relations that cognitive factives and emotive factives give rise to at the level of sentence meaning.

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